Abstract. Experimental results on the multiplicative orders of Gauss periods in nite elds are presented. These results indicate that Gauss periods have high order and are often primitive (self-dual) normal elements in nite elds. It is shown that Gauss periods can be exponentiated in quadratic time. An application is an e cient pseudorandom bit generator.
Introduction
For a prime power q, F q denotes the nite eld of q elements. Let n and k be positive integers such that r = nk + 1 is a prime, not dividing q, and K the unique subgroup of order k of the multiplicative group of Z r = Z =rZ. For any primitive rth root of unity in some extension eld of F q , the element = X a2K a is called a Gauss period of type (n; k) over F q . It is easy to see that a Gauss period of type (n; k) belongs to F q n . Adleman & Lenstra (1986) and Mullin et al. (1988) used Gauss periods to construct eld extensions and normal bases with special properties over nite elds.
A normal basis for F q n over F q is a basis of the form ; q ; : : : ; q n?1 generated by some 2 F q n . Any such is called a normal element.
A Gauss period of type (n; k) over F q generates a normal basis for F q n over F q if and only if gcd(e; n) = 1 where e denotes the index of q modulo r = nk + 1 (Wassermann 1990 . present a method for fast multiplication and division under the normal bases generated by Gauss periods; thus exponentiation in nite elds can be sped up. We refer to that paper and the books by Jungnickel (1993) and Menezes et al. (1993) for a discussion of the literature.
Gauss periods of type (n; 2) over F 2 also have other remarkable properties. Gao & Vanstone (1995) proved that they can be exponentiated in O(n 2 ) bit operations. This is faster than any known algorithms for exponentiation of an arbitrary element in F 2 n . The orders of Gauss periods of type (n; 2) over F 2 were also computed for n 1200. The experimental results in their paper show that Gauss periods have high multiplicative order, and in fact are often primitive elements over F 2 . This is useful in cryptosystems where a xed element needs to be raised to many large powers.
Naturally, one can ask if the above properties hold for Gauss periods of type (n; k) over F 2 with k > 2. In the next section, we prove that, for any xed k and q, a Gauss period of type (n; k) over F q can indeed be exponentiated in O(n 2 ) operations in F q . We computed the multiplicative orders of all Gauss periods of type (n; k) for n 1200 and 3 k 20 that generate normal bases for F 2 n over F 2 as far as the known factorizations of 2 n ? 1 permit. Our experiments show that Gauss periods of type (n; k) for k 3 also have high orders and are often primitive. This means that Gauss periods are often primitive normal elements. When k is even, the normal bases generated by Gauss periods of type (n; k) over F 2 are self-dual. Gauss periods thus are often primitive self-dual normal elements as well. In Section 3, we summarize our experimental results, state some conjectures about primitive normal elements, and show how to construct a primitive element from an element with high order. Finally, we mention in Section 4 some cryptographical applications. In particular, we describe a pseudorandom bit generator based on exponentiation in F 2 n , and discuss its security and e ciency.
Our work also contributes to the construction of primitive polynomials and primitive normal polynomials, since their irreducible polynomials are normal and primitive when Gausss periods are primitive. The related literature is mentioned at the end of Section 3.
Fast exponentiation of Gauss periods
In this section we show that, for xed k and q, a Gauss period of type (n; k) can be exponentiated in O(n 2 ) operations in F q ; see also .
A pair (n; k) is a Gauss pair over F q if r = nk + 1 is a prime not dividing q and gcd(e; n) = 1; where e is the index of q modulo r, i.e., e = nk=ord r (q). When q is understood, we simply say that (n; k) is a Gauss pair. It is always assumed that (n; k) is a Gauss pair in the sequel.
In the notation of the introduction, K is the unique subgroup of order k of Z r , where a 0 ; ; a n?1 ; a n 2 F q . Thus A is represented by an (n + 1)-tuple (a 0 ; ; a n?1 ; a n ). Of course, this representation is not unique; we just want to compute any one of the representations. For example, the unit 1 can either be represented as (0; ; 0; 1) or (?1; ; ?1; 0), since ?1 = P 0 i<n i . Our algorithm bene ts from this exibility.
Thus A q is the (n + 1)-tuple obtained from that of A by shifting cyclically the rst n coordinates to the right by one position (the last coordinate remains xed). So the cost for computing a qth power is negligible.
For any A 2 F q n and 0 j < n, we compute j A. Assume that A = ( P 0 i<n a i i )+ a n 2 F q n , with a 0 ; ; a n 2 F q . Then Exponentiation of an arbitrary element in F q n (with q bounded) costs O(n 2 loglog n) operations in F q by the currently fastest algorithm, with storage for O(n= log 2 q n) elements in F q n .
Recently, von zur Gathen & Pappalardi (1996) proved that, for any xed k and q, there are in nitely many values of n such that (n; k) is a Gauss pair over F q . In fact, they determine a positive density for the primes nk+1, where (n; k) is a Gauss pair, in the set of all primes. Thus, there are in nitely many elds F q n in which Gauss periods can be exponentiated easily. In the next section, we present experimental results which indicate that Gauss periods almost always have high order.
Experimental results
We computed the multiplicative orders of Gauss periods for all Gauss pairs (n; k) over F 2 with 3 k 20 and 2 n < 527, and also did the corresponding calculations for 527 n 1200 as far as current knowledge of the factors of 2 n ?1 permits.
The results are tabulated in the table of the appendix, where \Ind" denotes index, which equals 2 n ? 1 divided by the corresponding multiplicative order. An entry with a question mark \i?" in the \Ind" column means that the corresponding index was computed from the partial factorization of 2 n ?1, thus the true index is i times some of the unknown prime factors of 2 n ? 1 (we believe that these extra factors are unlikely to occur).
Our experiments show that Gauss periods have the expected multiplicative properties: they almost always have high multiplicative orders and are frequently primitive. More precisely, in the range 2 n < 527 and 2 k 20 there are 1179 Gauss pairs (n; k), all the corresponding Gauss periods have order (2 n ? 1)=n except for 8 pairs, and 906 of them are primitive. In the range 527 n 1200 and 2 k 20, there are 1239 Gauss pairs (n; k), and the corresponding Gauss periods have order (2 n ? 1)=n except for 5 pairs, and 965 of them are primitive, provided that the corresponding index entries i? are the true indices.
All the Gauss periods in the table generate normal bases over F 2 . When the index is 1, the corresponding basis is a primitive normal basis. Thus Gauss periods yields many primitive normal bases over F 2 . Also, when k is even, the normal basis generated by a Gauss period of type (n; k) over F 2 is self-dual .
We see that Gauss periods generate many primitive self-dual normal bases as well. Gao & Vanstone (1995) observe that if n and 2n + 1 are both primes then Gauss periods of type (n; 2) are primitive elements in F 2 n for n 1200. Our experimental data show that their observation still holds for general Gauss periods. It is formulated as follows.
Conjecture 3.1. If n and nk + 1 are both primes and k < log 2 (n + 1), then Gauss periods of type (n; k) form a primitive normal basis for F 2 n over F 2 .
We note that normality is not a problem here. Since the order m of 2 modulo nk + 1 is at least log 2 (nk + 1) log 2 (n + 1) > k, it follows that n divides m = nk=e and thus gcd(e; n) = 1.
Wassermann (1993) proves that for a given n there exists a Gauss pair (n; k) over F 2 if and only if 8 -n. There are 61 values of n 1200 for which there is no Gauss pair (n; k) with k 20. For each of these n, we list in the appendix the smallest Gauss pair (n; k) and the corresponding index (or index?).
Our computations lead us to believe that for every n not divisible by 8 there is a Gauss pair (n; k) yielding a primitive Gauss period F 2 n over F 2 . As an experiment, we veri ed this for all n < 527. If there is no primitive Gauss period for k 20, then the last entry of k is the smallest k whose Gauss period is primitive and normal in F Proof. Let e = (2 n ? 1)=m be the index of . Then e n c . Write e = e 1 e 2 , where gcd(e 2 ; m) = 1 and every prime divisor of e 1 divides m. Let 1 2 F q n satisfy e1 = ; and let 2 be a primitive e 2 th root of unity in F 2 n . Then 1 has order me 1 , and 1 2 has order me 1 e 2 = 2 n ? 1, as gcd(me 1 ; e 2 ) = 1. This means that 1 2 is primitive in F 2 n . For any e n c and 2 F 2 n , the polynomial x e ? can be factored (deterministically) in polynomial time. Thus 1 and 2 as above can be constructed in polynomial time.
In the special case e = 2 k ? 1, the equation x e ? can be written as x 2 k = x, which corresponds to a system of linear equations over F 2 , and can be solved by any e cient algorithms for linear equations. Our experimental data shows that many
Gauss periods have indices 3; 7; 15, etc, which are of the form 2 k ? 1. Thus from our table of Gauss periods, it is easy to construct primitive elements if one really needs primitive elements instead of elements of high orders. In the table, we give for each n < 527 and 8 -n, the smallest k such that a Gauss period of type (n; k) has index at most n. One can see that for these n it is possible to nd a reasonably small such k.
Finally, we make some comments on the related work in the literature. As mentioned in the introduction, our work also contributes to the construction of primitive polynomials and primitive normal polynomials, since their irreducible polynomials are normal and primitive when Gausss periods are primitive. Hansen & Mullen (1992) and Morgan & Mullen (1994) give tables of primitive polynomials and primitive normal polynomials of degree m over F p for all prime powers p m 10 50 with p 97 . Zivkovi c (1994a, 1994b) gives a more extensive table of primitive polynomials of degree m 1200 (and a few values of m between 1200 and 5000) over F 2 when the factorization of 2 m ? 1 is known. In their work, they search for sparse polynomials, i.e., those with the smallest number of nonzero terms. Such polynomials are useful in e cient implementation of feedback shift registers. In the extreme case, there is much interest in constructing irreducible trinomials over F 2 . Zierler & Brillhart (1968 , 1969 give a table of irreducible trinomials of degree 1000. Blake et al. (1994) extend this list to all irreducible trinomials of degree 2000 over F 2 (and a table for degree 5000 is available from the authors).
It is, however, not clear how primitive elements from sparse polynomials can be exponentiated faster than an arbitrary primitive element. The primitive polynomials from Gauss periods may not in general be sparse, but they do provide computational advantage in fast exponentiation as shown by Theorem 2.1.
Cryptographical applications
Let 2 F q n be a primitive element (or an element of high order, say at least (q n ? 1)=n c for some constant c). Computing the exponentiation function that maps x 2 f0; : : : ; q n ? 1g to x is easy, but computing its inverse function, i.e., computing x given x , called the discrete logarithm problem, is believed to be hard in general. This one-wayness of exponentiation has found many applications in public-key cryptography: Di e-Hellman key exchange ( Lim & Lee (1993) to construct cryptosystems that leak no partial information and are secure against adaptively chosen ciphertext attacks. In these applications, one needs a xed element of high order and computes t for many random large integers t. For example, in a signature scheme, for each signature one needs to generate a random integer t and compute t . Sometimes the computing power of the signature generating device is limited, e.g., in a smart card. So has to be chosen such that exponentiation of is easy. In practice, the currently popular choice for is from elements in F p . If the prime p has n bits, then computing t needs O(n 3 ) bit operations using repeated square and multiply method, or O(n 2 log n loglog n) bit operations using FFT-based fast multiplication algorithms.
However, if we choose to be a Gauss period of type (n; k) in F 2 n for a small k then the cost of exponentiating is reduced to O(n 2 ) bit operations, which is just the cost of one multiplication by the \classical" method. Our experimental results show that almost always has high order and is often primitive. Our exponentiation algorithm is also easy to implement. Gauss periods are therefore highly attractive in these applications.
In the following, we describe Blum & Micali's pseudorandom bit generator based on exponentiation in F p , then we adapt it to the elds F 2 n and comment on its security and e ciency.
A pseudorandom bit generator produces sequences of bits (0 or 1) that cannot be distinguished from truly random sequences of bits of equal length by any (probabilistic) polynomial time algorithm. Blum & Micali (1984) presented the following pseudorandom bit generator. Let m 1 be a xed integer. Given n 2, select an odd prime p of n bits, and a primitive root . Pick a random integer a 0 (the seed) in the range 1 < a 0 < p ? 1. Set a k+1 ak mod p for k 0; and b k+1 = 1 if a k+1 > (p ? 1)=2, and b k+1 = 0 otherwise. Then fb k : 1 k n m + mg is a sequence of n m + m bits generated from the n-bit seed a 0 . Blum & Micali (1984) proved that if the discrete logarithm problem is hard then this much longer sequence of bits is pseudorandom. Blum & Micali's generator outputs only one bit at each iteration, i.e., each bit costs one exponentiation mod p. Long & Wigderson (1988) extended this to output about log n bits at each iteration.
We now adapt the above generator to the elds F 2 n . Under a xed basis for F 2 n over F 2 , an element x 2 F 2 n is represented as a sequence of n bits (0 and 1). We use x to denote the integer whose binary representation is the same as x. Let 2 F 2 n be a primitive element (or an element of high order). Pick a random element x 0 2 F 2 n . Set x k+1 = xk for k 0; and let z k+1 be the least signi cant bit z k+1 = x k+1 mod 2: Then fz k : 1 k n m + mg is a sequence of bits generated from the seed x 0 . We want to show that this sequence is pseudorandom.
Let f be a one-way function, i.e, it is easy to compute but hard to invert. A Boolean predicate B (i.e., B(x) = 0 or 1) is said to be hard for f if an oracle for B(f(x)) allows one to invert f easily. Blum & Micali (1984, Theorem 2) proved that if B is a hard predicate for a one-way function f then the following sequence is pseudorandom:
B(f(a 0 )); B(f 2 (a 0 )); B(f 3 (a 0 )); ; B(f k (a 0 )); where a 0 is randomly chosen. To show that our sequence is pseudorandom, it is enough to prove Theorem 4.1 below. For any 2 F 2 n , the smallest positive integer x such that = x is called the discrete logarithm of with respect to , denoted by log . If no such x exists, we set (arbitrarily) log = 0. Theorem 4.1. Every bit of the discrete logarithm in F 2 n is a hard predicate (for the exponentiation function).
Proof. Let B(x) be the least signi cant bit of an integer x. We show how to compute discrete logarithms via an oracle for B(log ) which returns the least signi cant bit of the discrete logarithm of any 2 F 2 n . Note that for any integer i, log 2 where the index of a is computed modulo n, and log 2 i = (a n?i ; ; a n?1 ; a 0 ; ; a n?i?1 ) 2 : Therefore B(log 2 i ) = a n?i for 0 i n ? 1; and log = (B(log ); B(log 2 n?1 ); ; B(log 2 )) 2 : This means that log can be computed by n calls to the oracle. Since the bits can be shifted cyclically, log can also be computed by n calls to an oracle for any bit.
Therefore every bit is a hard predicate.
We have assumed that the oracle is perfect, that is, it always gives correct answers. Blum & Micali (1984) dealt with the more general case of nonperfect oracles (an oracle that may give wrong answers, but it gives correct answers su ciently more frequently than incorrect ones). It seems likely that Theorem 4.1 still holds for nonperfect oracles.
Our theorem says that every bit of the discrete logarithms is a hard predicate, that is, every bit is individually secure, provided the discrete logarithm is hard to compute. This is di erent from the discrete logarithms modulo an odd prime p, where its least signi cant bit is not secure while the most signi cant bit is indeed secure (Peralta 1986) . It seems also possible to modify the proof in Long & Wigderson (1988) to show that any O(log n) consecutive bits of the discrete logarithms in F 2 n are simultaneously secure. In this case, the modi ed pseudorandom bit generator could output O(log n) bits per iteration.
In implementing our pseudorandom bit generator in F 2 n , one can choose to be a Gauss period of type (n; k) for a small k. The cost of exponentiating at each iteration is only O(n 2 ) bit operations. This is advantageous compared to the generator in F p , where exponentiation needs O(n 2 log n log log n) bit operations by using fast multiplication algorithms.
